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Collateral is a prominent feature of debt contracts, and  significant declines in the value of widely 
pledged assets can amplify the business cycle through procyclical changes in credit availability, including 
during the recent financial crisis (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1990; Kiyatoki and Moore, 1997; 
Gan, 2007; Boz and Mendoza, 2014; Gorton and Ordonez 2014).  As U.S. housing prices began falling in 
the latter half of the 2000s, mortgage defaults rose substantially and the value of mortgage-related 
collateral plummeted.  As a result, households’ ability to borrow against their homes and financial 
institutions’ ability to pledge or sell mortgage-backed securities became impaired.  
While these events suggest that secured credit may be associated with higher risk, economic 
theory suggests that collateral pledges may be associated with either higher or lower risk.  The presence 
of collateral is generally explained as an attempt to reduce agency costs or contracting frictions in the 
presence of asymmetric information.
1
  One strand of theory focuses on ex ante private information and 
suggests that collateral may allow lenders to sort observationally equivalent loan applicants through 
signaling.
2
  Specifically, lenders offer a menu of contract terms such that observationally equivalent 
applicants with higher-quality projects choose secured debt with lower risk premiums, while those with 
lower-quality projects elect unsecured debt with higher risk premiums.  A second set of theories motivates 
collateral as part of an optimal debt contract by invoking ex post frictions, like moral hazard, and predicts 
that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to be required by lenders to pledge collateral.
3
   
                                                 
1
 Some theories of collateral do not emphasize the roles of asymmetric information.  For example, Inderst and 
Mueller (2007) show that collateral may be required by local relationship lenders facing competition from distant 
transactional lenders to boost profitability when lending to risky borrowers.  In addition, Manove, Padilla, and 
Pagano (2001) emphasize the role of collateral as a substitute for bank screening of borrowers. 
 
2
 For examples of these theoretical models, see Bester (1985, 1987), Besanko and Thakor (1987a, 1987b), Chan and 
Thakor (1987), and Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991). 
 
3
 See Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991), Boot and Thakor (1994), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997) for examples of models with moral hazard.  Other ex post frictions modeled in the literature include 
difficulties in enforcing contracts (e.g., Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 2004; Cooley, 
Marimon, and Quadrini, 2004) and costly state verification (e.g., Townsend, 1979; Gale and Hellwig, 1985; 




To test these theories, a number of empirical studies link measures of loan risk – such as loan risk 
premiums (loan rates minus the risk-free rate) and ex post nonperformance (delinquency or default) – to 
whether or not collateral was pledged.  The findings presented in these papers are mixed.  Some studies 
report a positive relation between loan risk premiums and collateral (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1990; 
Blackwell and Winters, 1997; Machauer and Weber, 1998; John, Lynch, and Puri, 2003; Brick and Palia, 
2007; Godlewski and Weill 2011), while others find a negative relation (e.g., Degryse and Van Cayseele, 
2000; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Agarwal and Hauswald, 2010; Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 
2011; Cerqueiro, Ongena, and Roszbach, forthcoming).
4
  One study finds no significant relation between 
collateral and loan risk premiums for loans drawn under commitment (Berger and Udell, 1995).  In 
addition, two studies find that ex post nonperformance of loans is positively related to collateral (Jimenez 
and Saurina, 2004; Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 2011).   
To our knowledge, there are no attempts to explain this puzzle in the literature – why the 
empirical relation between measures of loan risk and collateral is sometimes positive and at other times 
negative.  This paper provides a potential solution by examining the empirical relation between loan risk 
and the economic characteristics and types of collateral.  The implication is that the prior literature may 
have conflicting results because the secured loans in various data samples may be dominated by different 
types of collateral with different economic characteristics. 
The degree to which information-based contracting frictions are mitigated by collateral should 
depend on the underlying economic characteristics of the collateral.  All else equal, we hypothesize that 
the relation between collateral and loan risk should be stronger when the observable economic 
characteristics and types of collateral are more desirable to the borrower or lender.  Under the ex ante 
signaling theories of collateral, the unobservably safest borrowers are expected to pledge the collateral 
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 Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) report a negative relation between commercial loan rates and the incidence of 
collateral.  The result is presumably consistent with a negative relation between loan rate premiums and collateral, 
given that risk-free rates changed only modestly during their 15-month sample period. Using a differences-in-
differences approach, Cerqueiro, Ongena, and Roszbach (forthcoming) find that following the change in the law and 
the loss in collateral value borrowers pay a higher interest rate on their loans, receive a worse quality assessment by 




that is most desirable to them.  Under the collateral theories featuring ex post contracting frictions, the 
lender is likely to insist on collateral from the riskiest borrowers that is most desirable to the lender or the 
borrower.  In our analysis below, we focus on whether collateral can be characterized as being liquid or 
illiquid – with liquid collateral being more desirable – as well as on different types of collateral that may 
be more or less desirable.   
Some prior research analyzes individual economic characteristics of collateral and collateral 
types. Berger and Udell (1995) find that neither accounts receivable and inventory nor other types of 
collateral have significant effects on loan rate premiums on lines of credit for a sample of U.S. small 
businesses.  John, Lynch, and Puri (2003) study U.S. corporate debt and find that non-mortgage collateral 
pledges are associated with higher interest rates than mortgage collateral pledges and unsecured loans – a 
result that is stronger for longer-term loans and loans to riskier firms.  Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) 
examine small commercial loans from a large Belgian bank and find that the pledging of outside collateral 
(assets not otherwise legally attachable in the event of default) is more likely for informationally opaque 
firms (i.e., loans made to younger and family firms and firms with small loans).  Brick and Palia (2007) 
find that higher interest rates are charged for small business loans backed by outside collateral relative to 
inside collateral.  Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005) find that the terms of commercial real 
estate loans are affected by the zoning regulations associated with the underlying properties, which the 
authors use as a measure of redeployability.  We consider “redeployability” to be an aspect of “liquidity” 
because it easier to dispose of the asset.  The study finds that more redeployable assets receive larger 
loans with longer maturities and lower interest rates.  Liberti and Sturgess (2014) find that banks are 
willing to accept firm-specific assets susceptible to agency risk (e.g., plant, machinery, and inventory) for 
low agency risk firms and prefer non-specific assets (e.g., real estate, cash and bank guarantees) for firms 
that are most prone to agency risk.  Some non-specific assets, such as cash and bank guarantees, are 
consistent with our notion of collateral liquidity below.   
Three other papers empirically demonstrate that airline financing conditions are related to the 
redeployability (liquidity) of the firm’s fleet.  First, Benmelech and Bergman (2008) find that airlines are 
 4 
 
better able to renegotiate their airplane leases when the liquidation value of their fleet is low.  Second, 
Benmelech and Bergman (2009) find that the pricing of collateralized debt obligations financing airplanes 
depends on the aircraft model as bonds backed by more redeployable (liquid) airplanes carry lower 
interest rates.  Finally, Benmelech and Bergman (2011) show that airline bankruptcies produce a negative 
externality for other firms in the industry by increasing the available supply of airplanes.  The authors 
identify this “collateral channel” using prices for collateralized debt obligations – finding that the effect is 
stronger for less redeployable (liquid) models, less senior tranches, and higher loan-to-value ratios. 
This paper significantly extends the empirical literature by studying the relations between two 
measures of loan risk (loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance) and collateral overall, as well as 
with liquid versus illiquid collateral, and various collateral types using detailed commercial loan data 
provided by a national credit registry.  We first examine collateral on the extensive margin – comparing 
the pledging of any type of collateral with no collateral, consistent with most of the extant literature.  We 
then examine the intensive margin by considering differences between liquid and illiquid collateral, and 
types of collateral.  
A positive relation between loan risk and collateral would suggest the empirical dominance of the 
ex post theories as higher loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance indicate that riskier borrowers 
are being required by lenders to pledge collateral.  However, negative coefficients would be ambiguous as 
they could indicate either: (1) empirical dominance of the lower inherent risks of the borrowers that signal 
their safety by choosing secured loan contracts under the ex ante theories; or (2) empirical dominance of 
the ex post theories where the loss-mitigating effects of collateral and/or the incentive effects to take less 
risk under these theories more than offset the higher inherent risks of the secured borrowers.  Importantly, 
for our loan risk premium analysis, we are able to include firm-bank-time fixed effects that help us to 
better differentiate between the two main theories of collateral by eliminating the selection effects by both 
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borrowers and lenders and leaving only the loss-mitigating effects and incentive effects to take less risk 
from collateral, which are more associated with the ex post theories.
5
   
Our empirical analysis begins by relating our two measures of loan risk to a simple indicator of 
whether collateral was pledged to explore the extensive margin of collateral.  We consistently find that 
collateral is associated with lower loan risk premiums, which may be consistent with either the ex ante  or 
ex post theories.  Our novel dataset allows us to use fixed effects to control for lender and borrower 
selection effects, which resolve the ambiguity and indicate that the data are consistent with the empirical 
dominance of the ex post theories.    We also find that collateral is associated with a higher incidence of 
ex post nonperformance, reinforcing this conclusion.  
We next explore whether liquid or illiquid collateral is more associated with loan risk using the 
subset of secured loans along the intensive margin.  We find that liquid collateral is consistently 
associated with both lower loan risk premiums and ex post non-performance.  This is also consistent with 
the ex post theories, as liquid collateral appears to have especially strong risk-reducing incentives.  This 
finding is confirmed when we return to the full loan sample and study the differing relations among loan 
risk and liquid collateral, illiquid collateral, and no collateral.  Here liquid collateral is again associated 
with both lower loan risk premiums and ex post non-performance; but illiquid collateral is associated with 
lower loan risk premiums and a higher incidence of ex post nonperformance.  Nevertheless, for reasons 
discussed below, both findings are consistent with the empirical dominance of the ex post theories. 
Finally, we analyze the relations between our two loan risk measures and nine different collateral 
types. The findings are mixed.  While most collateral types appear to be consistent with the empirical 
dominance of the ex post theories, the results of some are more consistent with the ex ante theories.   
Overall, we conclude that the conflicting findings in the literature may occur because different 
samples may be dominated by different types of collateral with different economic characteristics like 
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 Khwaja and Mian (2008) and Schnabl (2012) employ a similar identification strategy to control for unobservable 
firm characteristics.  In their setting, these fixed effects are used to control for unobservable firm characteristics that 
may affect firms’ demand for credit. 
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liquidity. We suggest that whenever these characteristics can be identified or different collateral types are 
available, researchers should include them as their findings may be substantially enriched.   
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II describes the credit registry data 




Our commercial loan data come from the Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), 
the public credit registry of Bolivia, provided by the Bolivian Superintendent of Banks and Financial 
Entities (SBEF).  Prior research uses these data to address different research questions (e.g., Ioannidou 
and Ongena, 2010; Berger, Frame, and Ioannidou, 2011).  Since CIRC’s creation in 1989, the SBEF 
requires all formal (licensed and regulated) financial institutions operating in Bolivia to report detailed 
information on all loans.  Our sample covers the credit registry for the period between January 1998 and 
December 2003.  For each loan, we have information on origination and maturity dates, credit type, 
interest rate, collateral type, and ex post nonperformance (delinquencies and defaults) through the sample 
period.  For each borrower, we have information about their industry, physical location, legal structure, 
banking relationships, and whether they have been delinquent or defaulted on another loan in the recent 
past.   
The data include loans from both commercial banks and nonbank financial institutions (e.g., 
private financial funds, credit unions, mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses).  To keep the set 
of lenders homogenous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we focus exclusively on loans 
granted by the 13 commercial banks operating in Bolivia between March 1999 and December 2003.
6
  Our 
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 Although we have data as of January 1998, we start our sample in March 1999 since prior to this date the data do 
not allow us to distinguish been commercial and consumer loans.  However, we use the prior information from 
January 1998 through February 1999 to help fill in the history of bank-firm relationships as well as the firm’s credit 




sample of firms draws mostly from the larger and less risky firms in Bolivia, as smaller and riskier firms 
can only access microcredit institutions.  Even for our sample of relatively larger firms, there is very little 
reliable information other than what is available through the credit registry, as the vast majority of 
Bolivian firms do not have audited financial statements.  Moreover, capital markets are not well 
developed and the banking sector is the principal source of debt finance for most of these firms (Sirtaine, 
Skamelos, and Frank 2004).  
There are several types of commercial credit contracts in the data, including credit cards, 
overdrafts, installment loans, discount loans, and lines of credit.  We focus exclusively on installment 
loans and discount loans, which together account for 92 percent of the total value of commercial loans 
during the sample period.  Ninety eight percent of the installment and discount loans are denominated in 
U.S. dollars and we only use these loans in our analysis.  To ensure the use of timely information, we 
only use new loans and exclude renegotiations
7
 and loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit.
8
  We 
exclude loans with multiple types of collateral.  The resulting sample encompasses 28,252 loans (to 2,462 
different firms) of which 17.7 percent are secured.   
The types of security interests that Bolivian banks can invoke when accepting collateral are 
determined by law.
9
  Acceptable security interests on real property include mortgages, pledges, and 
collateral bonds.  Mortgages are used for immovable property (e.g., real estate) and some types of 
movable property (e.g., vehicles, aircraft, and boats).  Pledges and collateral bonds, on the other hand, are 
security interests on other kinds of movable property (e.g., equipment, inventory, and accounts 
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 Banks are required to indicate whether a loan is a renegotiation of a previous (performing or nonperforming) loan 
and we use this information to exclude renegotiations.  To the extent that some renegotiations are not recorded 
(either because of reporting errors or because banks do that intentionally to reduce their loan loss reserves), our 
sample will include some loans renegotiations as new loans.  Hence, in the sensitivity analysis below we try to 
control for this possibility by dropping all “suspected renegotiations” from our sample. 
 
8
 Loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit are identified as follows.  When a borrower draws on a pre-existing line 
of credit, a “new loan” appears in the registry with an origination date and contact terms as of the date the bank 
originated the credit line.  Since the date the loan first appears in the registry is subsequent to the origination date, 
we can identify when a “new loan” is a draw on a pre-existing line of credit and then exclude it from our sample. 
 
9




receivable).  There are two classes of pledges: with and without transfer of possession.  Pledges with 
transfer of possession (often referred to as “common pledges”) require the transfer of movable property to 
the creditor or an authorized warehouse.  Pledges without transfer of possession, on the other hand, are 
often used when the property is essential for the firm’s operations.10  A collateral bond (also known as a 
warrant) is a security issued by an authorized warehouse indicating possession of an asset and its value.  
By endorsing the collateral bond to a lender, the firm pledges the deposited assets to obtain secured credit.  
Hence, collateral bonds are similar to pledges with transfer of possession.  In addition to security interest 
on real property, Bolivian banks can also use security interest on financial assets such as bank guarantees, 
deposits in financial institutions, and financial securities.   
All types of security interests used by Bolivian banks must be registered with the pertinent 
authorities, along with the encumbered assets.  This is a time consuming and expensive process that often 
renders the use of collateral as impractical or prohibitively expensive, which may explain why the 
incidence of collateral in Bolivia is low relative to other countries.
11
  Registration allows for a more 
efficient enforcement in the event of default with the use of “Processo Coactivo Civil.”12  The “Processo 
Coactivo Civil” is a faster enforcement procedure that escapes automatic stay and allows lenders to 
invoke their security interests once the borrower has materially bridged its contractual obligations.
13
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 When there are concerns about agency problems, a warehouse can be set up at the firm’s premises to control 
access to the asset and at the same time allow the firm to continue using the asset.   
 
11
 According to the World Bank (2005), registering property in Bolivia takes on average 91 days – well above the 
same figure for the Latin American and the Caribbean regions overall (56 days) or for OECD countries (34 days).  
Similarly, the average cost of creating collateral (as a percentage of gross national income per capita) is 51 percent 
for Bolivia as opposed to 19 percent for Latin America and the Caribbean and five percent for OECD countries.   
 
12
 Ley de Abreviación Procesal y Asistencia Familiar, Law No. 1760 of February 28, 1997. 
 
13
 All other firm assets and obligations instead are subject to automatic stay once bankruptcy proceedings begin.  
Given the lengthy bankruptcy proceedings that characterize Bolivia and many other Civil Law countries, the 




Table 1 provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics for all loans in the sample.
14
  
At the time of loan origination, only 0.3 percent of the loans are given to firms that have defaulted in the 
prior 12 months (Prior_Default).  Hence, it seems that firms that default rarely get another loan — either 
because they are credit rationed or because they cease to exist as a going concern.  About 21.1 percent of 
the loans are given to firms that had a delinquency with any bank in the previous 12 months (Prior_NPL).  
Many of the sample firms are limited liability corporations (48.8 percent), while joint stock corporations 
(22.2 percent), limited partnerships (13.6 percent), sole proprietorships (12.6 percent), and general 
partnerships (0.8 percent) are less common.  The estimated average length of a banking relationship is 
almost 23 months.  This is defined as the number of months since the first loan in the data for the bank-
borrower pair as of January 1998.  Turning to loan characteristics, almost half of the sample consists of 
installment loans.  The average loan amount is $148,902, the average loan maturity is almost 11 months, 
and the average loan interest rate is 13.5 percent, with an average spread of 9.5 percentage points over 
U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturities. 
About 17.7 percent of our sample loans are secured by one of nine different types of assets.  Of 
the collateralized loans, nine percent are secured by deposits in the same or another financial institution, 
almost four percent are secured by bank guarantees (such as letters of credit), and about two percent with 
securities (such as bonds and stocks).  Movable firm assets (such as accounts receivable, inventory, crops, 
tools, machines and equipment) are frequently pledged.  For our sample, almost 16 percent of 
collateralized loans are secured by creditor-held movable collateral and almost 25 percent are secured by 
debtor-held movable collateral (i.e., pledges with and without transfer of possession).  Real estate is also a 
frequent form of collateral, as 20 percent of collateralized loans are secured by residential real estate and 
almost nine percent by commercial real estate.  Finally, almost 14 percent of collateralized loans are 
secured with endorsements from deposit warehouses backed by the deposit of commodities (i.e., collateral 
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 For relationship length, loan amount, and maturity we report summary statistics for the level of these variables, 




bonds), and two percent by vehicles.  With respect to ex post performance of the 25,918 loans that 
matured before the end of the sample period, 5.9 percent had ex post delinquencies or defaults.   
Different collateral types may be associated with certain economic characteristics.  Our analysis 
principally distinguishes between liquid and illiquid collateral to illustrate the sensitivity of the empirical 
relation between loan risk and collateral characteristics.  An asset is considered liquid if it can be 
converted into cash quickly without substantial discount on its price.  Hence, we create an indicator 
variable, Liquid, that takes a value one when the collateral is Pledged Deposits, Bank Guarantees, or 
Securities.  As shown in Table 1, about 15 percent of secured loans employ liquid collateral (with the 
remaining 85 percent of secured loans using illiquid collateral).  All else equal, liquidity is considered to 
be a desirable economic characteristic for both borrowers and lenders.  
The high degree of dollarization of the Bolivian credit market differentiates it from other 
countries in the region and around the world.  In this case, banks may be additionally exposed to 
exchange rate risk if a loan is denominated in dollars and the collateral is non-tradable and salable only in 
the local currency (e.g., real estate).
15
  This may also affect the distinction between liquid and illiquid 
collateral, since more of the liquid collateral (such as pledged deposits) may be denominated in dollars, 
while more of the illiquid collateral may be denominated in local currency.  This implies that in 
economies with high degree of dollarization, liquid collateral may be more attractive to banks because it 
may be less exposed to exchange rate risk (i.e., their future liquidation values maybe less susceptible to 
discounts from future depreciation of the local currency vis-à-vis the dollar).  Nevertheless, this does not 
alter our main conclusions that differences in the distributions of collateral characteristics and types in the 
data sets employed by researchers may result in different risk-collateral relations.  Rather it  implies that 
these relations may also interact with country-specific factors affecting the relative attractiveness of 
different types of collateral. 
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 Honohan (2007, Table 1) presents some figures illustrating the degree of dollarization in various developing 
countries.  High dollarization is not uncommon among developing countries who are experiencing (or did so in the 
past) hyperinflation.  
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Table 2 presents the sample statistics for Risk_Premium and Ex_Post_Nonperformance.  These 
are first delineated by whether the loan is secured or not; and then among secured loans whether the 
collateral is considered to be Liquid or Illiquid; and finally by collateral type. Collateralized loans have, 
on average, lower loan risk premiums and higher ex post nonperformance than uncollateralized loans.  
Among the subsample of collateralized loans, loans secured by liquid collateral on average maintain 
lower loan risk premiums and reduced ex post nonperformance relative to loans with illiquid collateral.  
Looking across collateral types, loans secured by Bank Guarantees or Creditor-Held Movable Assets 
carry the lowest average risk premiums and Residential Real Estate the highest.  In terms of ex post 
nonperformance, loans backed by Pledged Deposits or Bank Guarantees performed the best on average.  
This is the first preliminary evidence that the risk-collateral relation may vary with collateral 
characteristics and types. 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix of the loan risk variables with the collateral variables.  
Collateral pledges overall are negatively correlated with loan risk premiums and positively correlated 
with ex post nonperformance, suggesting an ambiguous relationship between collateral and risk (to be 
reconciled in the regression analyses below).  However, there are differences between liquid and illiquid 
collateral.  Liquid Collateral is negatively correlated with both loan risk measures – a feature specifically 
driven by Pledged Deposits and Bank Guarantees.  By contrast, Illiquid Collateral is negatively 
correlated with loan risk premiums and positively correlated with ex post nonperformance.  This relation 
is consistent across the six illiquid collateral types in our data – except that loans secured by Residential 
Real Estate are associated with higher risk premiums.  These correlations suggest that individual 
collateral characteristics and types may have different relations with the loan risk measures. 
  
III. Empirical Analysis 
We examine the relation between loan risk and collateral by conducting empirical tests using two 
different measures of loan risk – loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance.  We first examine 
collateral on the extensive margin – comparing the pledging of any type of collateral with no collateral, 
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consistent with the extant literature.  We later examine the intensive margin by considering the economic 
characteristics and types of collateral. 
We run four loan risk premium regressions for the extensive margin using OLS, each including a 
different set of control variables.  These regressions take the general form: 
 
Risk_Premiumijkt = a(Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )         (1) 
 
where i, j, k, l, m and t index loans, firms, banks, industries, regions, and time, respectively, and differ 
according to which of the controls are included.  In these regressions, Risk_Premium is defined as the 
loan interest rate minus the rate on U.S. Treasury securities of comparable maturity for the month of loan 
origination.
16
  The key explanatory variable is a simple indicator of whether the loan was collateralized or 
not – Collateral.    
In the first regression, we include only a few control variables.  We include Installment, a dummy 
variable equal to one if the contract specifies an installment loan rather than a discount loan because these 
two types of loans have different repayment structures.  We also include Region, a set of dummy 
variables that indicate the location from which the loan was originated.  This includes nine regions in 
Bolivia as well as Argentina, Paraguay, Panama, and the United States.  Moreover, bank and time 
(month-year) fixed effects are included in the model, represented by Bank and Time, respectively.  Bank 
fixed effects are designed to capture systematic differences across banks in the pricing of their 
commercial loans.  The time fixed effects are intended to account for temporal differences in loan risk 
premiums related to business, interest rate, seasonal, or credit cycles.   
As discussed in the introduction, the coefficient on Collateral may help reveal whether the ex 
ante signaling theories that address the adverse selection problem or the ex post requirements to address 
the moral hazard problem are relatively more important.  A positive coefficient would suggest empirical 
dominance of the ex post theories as a higher Risk_Premium would indicate that riskier borrowers are 
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being required by lenders to pledge collateral and are being charged a higher rate to compensate for this 
risk.  However, a negative coefficient would be ambiguous.  It could indicate the lower inherent risks of 
the borrowers that signal their risk by choosing secured loan contracts under the ex ante theories.  
Alternatively, it could reflect that the ex post theories were more prevalent, but that the loss-mitigating 
effects of collateral and/or the perceived incentive effects to take less risk more than offset the higher 
inherent risks of the secured borrowers.  We show below a specification that disentangles these effects. 
In the second specification of equation (1), we add firm characteristics for the past 
nonperformance of the firm, legal structure of the firm, industry, and relationship with the bank.  Past 
nonperformance is measured by Prior_Default, which indicates whether the borrowing firm had defaulted 
on a loan with any lender in the previous 12 months and Prior_NPL, indicates whether the borrowing 
firm missed a payment on a loan with any lender in the previous 12 months.  The set of dummy variables 
indicating the legal structure of the firm are General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Joint Stock 
Company, and Limited Liability Corporation (Sole Proprietorship is the omitted group).  Industry is a set 
of 18 dummy variables controlling for the firm’s industry classification (similar to the SIC and NAICS 
codes in the U.S.).
17
  Finally, we include Relationship Length, which indicates the length of a bank-firm 
relationship and it is equal to the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months we observe the bank 
and borrower in a credit relationship.  This specification has almost the same interpretations of the 
coefficient on Collateral as the first specification, except that the selection effects by both borrowers and 
lenders are attenuated because there are more controls included for the borrower’s risk. 
Our third specification of equation (1) includes firm fixed effects interacted with bank and time 
fixed effects, i.e., Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects.  Time-invariant firm and industry variables and 
relationship length, as well as the individual bank and time fixed effects must be omitted from this 
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 The 19 industry categories are: Agriculture and cattle; Farming; Forestry and fishery; Extraction of oil and gas; 
Minerals; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, and water; Construction; Wholesale and retail trade; Hotels and 
restaurants; Transport, storage, and communications; Financial Intermediation; Real estate activities; Public 
administration defense, and compulsory social security; Education; Communal and personal social services; 





specification because of perfect collinearity.  Parameter identification in this case is obtained from the 
subsample of firms with more than one loan from the same bank in the same month.  The addition of 
these interacted fixed effects help us to better differentiate between the two main theories of collateral by 
eliminating the selection effects by both firms and banks.  That is, they compare the same firms at the 
same time borrowing from the same bank, so that there is no difference in signaling by the firms or 
collateral requirements by the banks related to firm risk.  This leaves only the loss-mitigating effects and 
the risk-reduction incentive effects of collateral.  To the extent that the coefficient on Collateral is 
negative, it provides support for the ex post theories, under which riskier borrowers for whom these loss-
mitigation and incentive effects are likely much larger.  
In our fourth specification of equation (1), we add two additional loan characteristics: Amount 
and Maturity.  We exclude these variables from our main specifications because they are potentially 
endogenous, as they may be determined simultaneously or even after the collateral decision.  As shown 
below, the results do not change substantially with the inclusion of these terms.  
We also run the four specifications of the Risk_Premium regressions using collateral 
characteristics and types to investigate the intensive margin.  First, to test whether different collateral 
characteristics are more strongly associated with the different theories, we limit the sample to secured 
loans and differentiate between liquid and illiquid collateral using the following form:  
Risk_Premiumijkt = b(Liquid Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )     (2) 
As noted above, Liquid Collateral takes a value of one when the collateral is either: Pledged Deposits, 
Bank Guarantees, or Securities.  Other types of collateral are collectively treated as illiquid and constitute 
the omitted category.  Loans with no collateral are excluded from this estimation.  This regression allows 
us to determine whether Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral have the same risk-collateral relation. 
Next, we use both Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral in the same specification and 
reexamine the full sample of loans, including those with no collateral pledged as the omitted category:  
Risk_Premiumijkt = c(Liquid Collateralijkt, Illiquid Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, 
 Regionm, Timet )     (3) 
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This specification allows us to see whether loans with Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral are 
associated with higher or lower risk than loans with no collateral pledged.  
Our final specifications of the Risk_Premium regressions use dummy variables for all nine types 
of collateral and include the full sample, using no collateral as the omitted category: 
Risk_Premiumijkt = d(Pledged Depositsijkt, Bank Guaranteesijkt, Securitiesijkt, Creditor-Held Movable Assetsijkt,  
Debtor-Held Movable Assetsijkt, Residential Real Estateijkt, Commercial Real Estateijkt, Collateral Bondsijkt, Vehiclesijkt, 
 Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )     (4) 
This specification allows us to see whether loans with different types of collateral are associated with 
higher or lower risk than loans with no collateral pledged.  
We also run regressions using Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt as a dependent variable.  This 
variable indicates whether the loan eventually becomes delinquent or defaults, but does not measure the 
size of any losses.  As above, this measure is separately regressed on Collateral using the full sample, 
Liquid using only secured loans, Liquid and Illiquid using the full sample, and all nine collateral types 
using the full sample:   
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = e(Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )  (5) 
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = f(Liquid Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm,  
         Timet )  (6) 
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = g(Liquid Collateralijkt, Illiquid Collateralijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, 
Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )  (7) 
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijkt = h(Pledged Depositsijkt, Bank Guaranteesijkt, Securitiesijkt, Creditor-Held Movable 
Assetsijkt, Debtor-Held Movable Assetsijkt, Residential Real Estateijkt, Commercial Real Estateijkt, Collateral Bondsijkt, 
             Vehiclesijkt, Firmjt, Relationshipjkt, Loanijkt, Bankk, Industryl, Regionm, Timet )  (8) 
For the analysis of Ex_Post_Nonperformance, we drop all loans that do not mature before the end of the 
sample (December 2003); thereby leaving 26,033 bank loans.  Since this has the effect of reducing the 
average loan maturity in our sample, we also eliminate all loans originated during the last six months of 
the sample (July – December 2003) – further reducing the sample to 25,391 loans.   
There are two important differences between the Ex_Post_Nonperformance and Risk_Premium 
regressions.  First, the loss-mitigating effects of collateral are missing from these regressions because the 
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dependent variable does not capture the size of any losses.  Second, we cannot include firm fixed effects 
to control for unobserved borrower heterogeneity that may be correlated with collateral pledges.  The 
reason is that we have very few nonperformance observations that are repeated for individual borrowers. 
 
IV. Results 
Table 4 presents the results for the loan risk premium regressions for collateral overall and 
collateral characteristics.  Columns I-III show the baseline specifications of equations (1), (2), and (3), 
which include only the collateral variables – Collateral in column (I), Liquid Collateral in column (II), 
and Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral in column (III) – along with Installment, and the fixed 
effects for Region, Bank and Time.  Columns IV-VI replicate columns I-III, except that additional controls 
are added for the past nonperformance of the firm (Prior_Default and Prior_NPL), legal structure of the 
firm (General Partnership, Limited Partnership, Joint Stock Company, and Limited Liability 
Corporation, with Sole Proprietorship as the omitted group), industry fixed effects (Industry), and 
relationship with the bank (Relationship Length).  Columns VII-IX incorporate Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed 
effects, while removing all time-invariant firm characteristics and relationship length, as well as the 
individual bank and time fixed effects.  Finally, columns X-XII additionally control for two potentially 
endogenous loan contracts terms (Amount and Maturity).  When only Liquid Collateral is included in 
columns II, V, VIII, and XI, only the subsample of secured loans is included.   
Importantly, the borrower and lender selection effects highlighted in the ex ante and ex post 
theories are present only in columns I-VI, while the regressions in columns VII-XII virtually eliminate 
these effects, as parameters are identified by effectively comparing loans to the same borrower by the 
same lender at approximately the same point in time.  Only the loss-mitigation and risk-reduction 
incentive effects of collateral are present in the latter columns. 
Table 5 provides the results for the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions.  The table is structured 
like Table 4, except that we exclude the Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects.  As mentioned previously, we 
cannot estimate the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions using firm fixed effects because there are too 
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few nonperformance observations that are repeated for individual borrowers.  Also noted above, the 
sample for the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions is slightly smaller than that for the Risk_Premium 
regressions because we drop all loans that do not mature before the end of the sample and eliminate all 
loans originated during the last six months of the sample.  Finally, as noted, the loss-mitigating effects of 
collateral are missing from these regressions because the dependent variable does not capture the size of 
any losses. 
A. Collateral Overall.   
The estimated relation between loan risk premiums and the overall incidence of collateral is 
displayed in columns I, IV, VII, and X of Table 4.  In each of these regressions, we find a negative 
relation between the loan risk premiums and collateral.  The results in column I suggest that collateral 
overall is associated with a 60 basis point discount.  As discussed above, a negative coefficient has an 
ambiguous interpretation.  It could reflect the lower inherent risks of the borrowers that signal their risk 
by choosing secured loan contracts under the ex ante theories.  Alternatively, it could indicate that the ex 
post theories were more prevalent, but that the loss-mitigating effects of collateral and/or the risk-
reduction incentive effects more than offset the higher inherent risks of the secured borrowers.  Moving 
from column I to column IV, we control for several firm characteristics and the coefficient remains close 
to -0.60.  In column VII, the lender and borrower selection effects are virtually eliminated by including 
Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects.  The coefficient on Collateral remains relatively constant.  This suggests 
that the measured negative relations in columns I and IV are mainly driven by the loss-mitigation and 
risk-reduction incentive effects of collateral.  This provides support for the ex post theories, under which 
riskier borrowers for whom these loss-mitigation and risk-reduction incentive effects are likely much 
larger.   
We will return to Table 4 later to examine the effects of collateral characteristics, but we turn now 
to Table 5, which presents the marginal effects of Probit models for ExPost_Nonperformance In column 
I, the overall risk-collateral relation is positive, again suggesting the net empirical dominance of the ex 
post theories, given that lender selection effect of these theories is the only one that predicts a positive 
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marginal effect.  The marginal effects remain positive as we move from column I to columns IV and VII, 
controlling for firm and other loan characteristics.  All in all, the results suggest that the ex post theories 
appear to dominate the ex ante theories in explaining the overall collateral decisions on the extensive 
margin.   
B. Liquid versus Illiquid Collateral 
We next turn to the investigation of the intensive margins by examining the estimated relation 
between both the loan risk premiums and ex post nonperformance and whether liquid or illiquid collateral 
is pledged.  In columns II, V, VIII, and XI of Table 4, we drop the unsecured loans and estimate the effect 
of liquid versus illiquid collateral on Risk_Premium by including Liquid Collateral and using Illiquid 
Collateral as the omitted category.  In these regressions, we find that the incidence of Liquid Collateral is 
associated with lower loan risk premiums and this is maintained when the two selection effects are 
virtually absorbed by the fixed effects.  This suggests that the loss mitigation and risk shifting effects of 
collateral under the ex post theories apply more strongly to those pledging Liquid Collateral than Illiquid 
Collateral.  This is consistent with the intuition that liquid collateral is more desired by lenders to reduce 
their exposures to risky borrowers. 
Analyzing Ex_Post_Nonperformance in columns II, V, and VIII of Table 5, we find that loans 
secured by Liquid Collateral become delinquent or default less often than those with Illiquid Collateral.  
This is consistent with borrowers having greater incentives not to lose the more desirable liquid collateral.  
Similarly, lenders may have greater incentives to enforce their security interests and resist renegotiation 
pressures when collateral is liquid and can be sold quicker with smaller discounts in secondary markets.   
To investigate the intensive margin further, we turn to the Risk_Premium regressions in columns 
III, VI, IX, and XII in Table 4using the full sample; and where dummies of Liquid Collateral and Illiquid 
Collateral are specified and no collateral is the omitted category.  Here, we consistently see negative 
coefficients for both Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral but with much larger magnitudes for Liquid 
Collateral.  These effects persist with the inclusion of Firmj*Bankk*Timet fixed effects; thereby 
suggesting that the ex post theories empirically dominate the ex ante theories for both liquid and illiquid 
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collateral.  The coefficients on Liquid Collateral and Illiquid Collateral are also statistically significantly 
different from one another at the one percent level in all cases (t-statistics not shown).  This also suggests 
that the specification accounting for collateral characteristics, like liquidity, is superior to the common 
method of just considering collateral overall. 
In Table 5, columns III, VI, and IX, the marginal effects of Liquid Collateral are negative and the 
marginal effects of Illiquid Collateral are positive in the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions.  The 
difference is statistically significant at the one percent level in all cases (t-tests not shown).  This is again 
consistent with the intuition that the risk-reduction incentive of liquid collateral is stronger than that of 
illiquid collateral.   
Turning to the other explanatory variables in Tables 4 and 5, we see that Prior_NPL is positively 
related to both Risk_Premium and Ex_Post_Nonperformance as expected, but the signs of Prior_Default 
are conflicting in the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions, perhaps owing to the small number of loans 
to firms that had recently defaulted and received new credit.  Relative to sole proprietorships, each of the 
other ownership structures are generally associated with lower loan risk premiums, although the signs are 
again conflicting in the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions.  Longer banking relationships appear to be 
associated with higher loan risk premiums and lower rates of ex post nonperformance (although the latter 
is not always statistically significant), the former being consistent with “lock-in effects” in which lenders 
exert market power over relationship borrowers (e.g., Rajan, 1992).  Riskier firms are more likely to have 
installment loans, as they are associated with higher loan risk premiums and higher rates of ex post 
nonperformance. 
 
C. Collateral Types 
In our final analysis, we specify all nine collateral types identified in the dataset, using no 
collateral as the omitted category.  The results are reported in Table 6.  The first four columns of the table 
report corresponding specifications for the Risk_Premium regressions in Table 4, while the last three 
columns report the corresponding specifications for the Ex_Post_Nonperformance regressions in Table 5.  
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The Risk_Premium regressions in Table 6 show substantial differences across collateral types.  
Some types show negative coefficients across all specifications (e.g., Pledged Deposits), consistent with 
the empirical dominance of the ex post theories.  Others show negative coefficients for the first two 
specifications, which become statistically insignificant when the Firm*Bank*Time terms are included 
(e.g., Commercial Real Estate), supporting the dominance of the ex ante theories.  The 
Ex_Post_Nonperformance show even more differences across collateral types, with most of the liquid 
collateral types being associated with lower ex post nonperformance and most of the illiquid collateral 
types being associated with higher ex post nonperformance.  The heterogeneity of both sets of results 
suggest that exploiting information about collateral types can uncover subtle relationships with borrower 
risk.   
 
D. Robustness Tests 
Our empirical results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 are robust to two additional checks.  Our most 
conservative specifications above with the Firm*Bank*Time fixed effects in Tables 4 and 6 are estimated 
for a subsample of firms with multiple loans from the same bank in the same month (13,274 loans).  In 
the specifications where identification of parameters is obtained from the intensive margin (i.e., within 
secured loans) we further require that firms have multiple secured loans from the same bank in the same 
month (4,989 loans).  This raises the question of whether the results in Tables 4 and 6 for the larger 
sample – those without the Firm*Bank*Time fixed effects -- are robust to using these smaller samples of 
loans.  Re-estimating the regressions with these sub-samples yields Collateral coefficients that are very 
similar those reported above. These results are not shown for brevity and are available upon request.  
Next, we re-estimate our main specifications after dropping all loans that appear to be 
continuations of previous loans.  (Loans designated in the registry as renegotiations have already been 
excluded from our analysis.)  Including continuations of previous loans could bias the estimated relations 
between ex post nonperformance and collateral.  This bias would arise in situations in which the borrower 
became distressed and the bank demanded that collateral is pledged, but recorded the adjustment as a new 
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loan with overdue payments.  To identify such situations, we look for loans that are originated right after 
another loan at the same bank terminates and the two loans have the same contract amounts.  We identify 
2,184 such loans.  Re-estimating the specification in Tables 4 and 5 after dropping for this sub-sample has 
virtually no effect on the results: the signs, size, and statistical significance of all collateral coefficients 
remains unchanged.  These results are also not shown for brevity and are available upon request. 
 
VI. Conclusions   
Economic theory suggests that collateral pledges may be associated with either higher or lower 
risk.  One strand of theory focuses on ex ante private information and suggests that collateral may allow 
lenders to sort observationally equivalent loan applicants through signaling.  A second set of theories 
motivates collateral as part of an optimal debt contract by invoking ex post frictions, like moral hazard, 
and predicts that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to be required by lenders to pledge 
collateral.   
The empirical literature has found that loan risk and collateral are sometimes found to be 
positively related and other times found to be negatively related.  This paper offers a potential solution to 
this puzzle by highlighting variations in the risk-collateral relation depending on the role of the economic 
characteristics of collateral, like liquidity, as well as collateral types. Hence, certain economic 
characteristics or types of collateral may be more strongly associated with the different theories.   
Using credit registry data and a novel identification strategy to control for borrower and lender 
selection effects allows us to differentiate between the ex ante and ex post theories of collateral.  We find 
that the data on collateral overall is associated with the empirical dominance of the ex post theories on the 
extensive margin.  Liquid and illiquid collateral have somewhat different relations with our risk measures, 
indicating somewhat different levels of support for the theories on the intensive margin.  We also find that 
individual collateral types exhibit significant variation in terms of risk-collateral relations, with some 
consistent with ex ante theories and others with ex post theories. 
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Collateral does not appear to be homogeneous in its economic effects, and hence future research 
should include information about the economic characteristics and/or types of collateral whenever 
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Table 1: Variables and Summary Statistics 
The table reports the names, definitions, and summary statistics (observations, means, and standard deviations) of 
variables used in the analysis.  The summary statistics for the collateral types and characteristics are based only on the set 
of loans for which collateral is pledged.  The summary statistics for Ex_Post_Nonperformance use the number of loans 
that matured before the end of the sample period.  The summary statistics for all other variables are based on the full 
sample of loans.  
Variables Description Obs Mean St. Dev.
Interest Rate Annual contractual interest rate at loan origination 28,252       13.538 2.848
Maturity Number of months between loan origination and maturity 28,252       10.757 12.833
Risk_Premium Loan interest rate minus U.S. Treasury rate of comparable maturity at origination 28,252       9.507 2.557
Amount Loan amount at loan origination in US dollars 28,252       148,902 436,026
Installment Equals one if an installment loan and zero if a discount loan 28,252       0.456 0.498
Collateral Equals one if collateral was pledged at loan origination, and is zero otherwise 28,252       0.177 0.381
   Types of Collateral
   Pledged Deposits Equals one if deposits were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.091 0.287
   Bank Guarantees Equals one if bank guarantees or letters of credit were pledged, and is 4,989         0.037 0.188
 zero otherwise
   Securities Equals one if bonds or stocks were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.022 0.146
   Creditor-Held Movable Assets Equals one if there is a possessory security on the firm's movable assets (e.g., 4,989         0.158 0.364
inventory, crops, properties, tools, and equipment), and is zero otherwise
   Debtor-Held Movable Assets Equals one if there is a non-possessory security on the firm's movable assets 4,989         0.248 0.432
(e.g., a/cs receivable, inventory, crops, properties, tools, and equipment), 
and is zero otherwise
   Residential Real Estate Equals one if a residential real estate is pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.199 0.399
   Commercial Real Estate Equals one if a commercial real estate is pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.088 0.283
   Collateral Bonds Equals one if a loan is secured with endorsements from deposit warehouses 4,989         0.135 0.342
backed by the deposit of commodities ("Bonos de Prenda").
   Vehicles Equals one if vehicles were pledged, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.023 0.149
  Collateral Characteristics
   Liquid Collateral Equals one if the type of collateral pledged is deposits, bank guarantees, 4,989         0.149 0.356
or securities, and is zero otherwise
   Illiquid Collateral Equals one if the type of collateral pledged is not liquid, and is zero otherwise 4,989         0.851 0.356
Past Nonperformance
Prior_Default Equals one if the borrower had defaulted on a loan anytime in the previous 28,252       0.003 0.052
12 months with any lender, and is zero otherwise
Prior_NPL Equals one if the borrower had overdue payments of at least 30 days with 28,252       0.211 0.408
any bank anytime in the previous 12 months, and is zero otherwise
Sole Proprietorship Equals one if the firm is a sole proprietorship, and is zero otherwise 28,252       0.126 0.332
General Partnership Equals one if the firm is a general partnership (i.e., all partners have unlimited 28,252       0.008 0.091
liability and ownership is not transferable), and is zero otherwise
Limited Partnership Equals one if the firms is a limited partnership (i.e., some partners have limited 28,252       0.136 0.343
 liability and their ownership rights are transferable), and is zero otherwise
Joint Stock Company Equals one if the firm is a joint stock company (i.e., all partners have unlimited 28,252       0.222 0.415
liability and their ownership rights are transferable), and is zero otherwise
Limited Liability Company Equals one if the firm is a limited liability company (i.e., all partners have limited 28,252       0.488 0.500
liability and transferable ownership rights), and is zero otherwise
Rel_Length Length of bank-firm relationship in months 28,252       22.704 15.769
Ex Post Loan Performance
Ex_Post_Nonperformance Equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after origination or if it is 25,983       0.059 0.236
downgraded to the default status (a rating of 5) and zero otherwise






Table 2: Risk Premium, Ex Post Nonperformance, and Collateral  
The table reports the summary statistics (observations, means, and standard deviations) for the dependent variables 
Risk_Premium and Ex_Post_Nonperformance for loans with and without collateral, for loans secured with liquid 
and illiquid collateral, and those secured by nine different types of collateral. 
Obs Mean St. Dev. Obs Mean St. Dev.
No Collateral 23,263      9.651 2.412 23,263      0.050 0.217
Collateral 4,989        8.839 3.062 4,989        0.083 0.276
Liquid Collateral 745           8.302 3.081 745           0.027 0.162
Illiquid Collateral 4,244        8.933 3.049 4,244        0.093 0.291
Pledged Deposits 452           8.646 2.965 452           0.020 0.140
Bank Guarantees 184           6.631 3.193 184           0.027 0.163
Securities 109           9.695 2.052 109           0.055 0.229
Creditor-Held Movable Assets 786           6.750 2.839 786           0.095 0.294
Debtor-Held Movable Assets 1,239        8.809 3.169 1,239        0.103 0.303
Residential Real Estate 992           10.478 2.529 992           0.089 0.284
Commercial Real Estate 439           9.427 2.717 439           0.100 0.301
Collateral Bonds 675           9.068 2.552 675           0.074 0.262





Table 3: Correlation Matrix  
The table reports correlations among the key variables used in the analysis. 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]
Risk_Premium [1] 1
Ex_Post_Nonperformance [2] 0.083 1
Collateral [3] -0.121 0.056 1
Liquid Collateral [4] -0.078 -0.021 0.355 1
Illiquid Collateral [5] -0.094 0.069 0.908 -0.069 1
Pledged Deposits [6] -0.043 -0.020 0.275 0.775 -0.054 1
Bank Guarantees [7] -0.091 -0.010 0.175 0.492 -0.034 -0.010 1
Securities [8] 0.005 0.000 0.134 0.378 -0.026 -0.008 -0.01 1
Creditor-Held Movable Assets [9] -0.182 0.030 0.365 -0.028 0.402 -0.022 -0.01 -0.011 1
Debtor-Held Movable Assets [10] -0.059 0.044 0.463 -0.035 0.509 -0.027 -0.02 -0.013 -0.036 1
Residential Real Estate [11] 0.072 0.028 0.412 -0.031 0.454 -0.024 -0.02 -0.012 -0.032 -0.041 1
Commercial Real Estate [12] -0.004 0.025 0.271 -0.021 0.299 -0.016 -0.01 -0.008 -0.021 -0.027 -0.02 1
Collateral Bonds [13] -0.027 0.013 0.338 -0.026 0.372 -0.020 -0.01 -0.010 -0.027 -0.034 -0.03 -0.020 1




Table 4: Determinants of Loan Risk Premiums 
This table reports OLS regressions for Risk_Premiumijt, defined as the loan interest rate at origination minus the rate 
of U.S. Treasury securities with comparable maturity.  Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using 
White standard errors and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Collateral
   Collateral -0.600*** -0.580*** -0.636*** -0.525***
(0.0441) (0.0431) (0.0956) (0.0973)
Collateral Characteristics
   Liquid Collateral -0.970*** -1.428*** -0.980*** -1.395*** -0.722** -1.028*** -0.691** -1.003***
(0.111) (0.0979) (0.116) (0.100) (0.281) (0.197) (0.305) (0.203)
   Illiquid Collateral -0.415*** -0.398*** -0.558*** -0.427***
(0.0473) (0.0457) (0.103) (0.104)
Past Nonperformance
  Prior_Default 0.739*** 0.494 0.686***
(0.242) (0.336) (0.241)
  Pior_NPL 0.468*** 0.675*** 0.465***
(0.0295) (0.0757) (0.0294)
Legal Structure of the Firm
  General Partnership -0.403*** -0.266 -0.428***
(0.137) (0.439) (0.138)
   Limited Partnership -0.345*** -0.342*** -0.362***
(0.0480) (0.126) (0.0478)
  Joint Stock -1.269*** -1.046*** -1.262***
(0.0436) (0.114) (0.0434)
  Limited Liability Company -0.397*** 0.0342 -0.395***
(0.0360) (0.106) (0.0358)
Relation Characteristic
  Rel_Length 0.0368** 0.0688* 0.0366**
(0.0162) (0.0369) (0.0162)
Other Loan Characteristics
   Installment 0.0773*** 0.264*** 0.0563** 0.0467* 0.154** 0.0276 0.0663 -0.393** 0.0614 0.575*** -0.142 0.574***
(0.0267) (0.0802) (0.0266) (0.0257) (0.0781) (0.0257) (0.0486) (0.176) (0.0482) (0.0640) (0.219) (0.0640)
   Amount 0.0161 0.0568* 0.0170
(0.0205) (0.0306) (0.0203)
   Maturity -0.519*** -0.353** -0.525***
(0.0428) (0.140) (0.0424)
Constant 11.12*** 10.53*** 11.14*** 10.79*** 10.32*** 10.81*** 9.247*** 8.522*** 9.246*** 9.837*** 8.454*** 9.835***
(0.0987) (0.353) (0.0978) (0.127) (0.379) (0.126) (0.0255) (0.0635) (0.0254) (0.205) (0.316) (0.203)
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm*Bank*Time Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 28,252 4,989 28,252 28,252 4,989 28,252 13,274 1,888 13,274 13,274 1,888 13,274
R-squared 0.352 0.413 0.355 0.406 0.460 0.409 0.922 0.958 0.922 0.925 0.959 0.925
Baseline (+) Firm* Bank*Time FE &
Other Loan Characteristics
(+) Firm*Bank*Time FE(+) Firm Characteristics
 
  
Table 5: Determinants of Ex Post Nonperformance 
This table reports the marginal effects of Probit regressions for Ex_Post_Nonperformance, a dummy variable that 
equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue any time after origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., 
given a rating of 5).  For continuous variables, we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in each independent 
variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1, evaluated at the mean of all 
independent variables.   Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors and are 
reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Collateral
   Collateral 0.0350*** 0.0283*** 0.0281***
(0.00478) (0.00460) (0.00468)
Collateral Characteristics
   Liquid Collateral -0.0636*** -0.0162** -0.0532*** -0.0131** -0.0511*** -0.0123*
(0.00772) (0.00691) (0.00741) (0.00664) (0.00711) (0.00674)
  Illiquid Collateral 0.0447*** 0.0356*** 0.0353***
(0.00554) (0.00529) (0.00540)
Past Nonperformance
  Prior_Default 0.0202 -0.0480*** 0.0182 0.0175 -0.0463*** 0.0157
(0.0255) (0.0170) (0.0248) (0.0246) (0.0154) (0.0240)
  Pior_NPL 0.0613*** 0.0895*** 0.0609*** 0.0627*** 0.0868*** 0.0623***
(0.00438) (0.0119) (0.00436) (0.00443) (0.0118) (0.00441)
Legal Structure of the Firm
  General Partnership -0.0117 0.0551 -0.0123 -0.0141 0.0681 -0.0145
(0.0104) (0.0663) (0.0101) (0.00977) (0.0729) (0.00955)
   Limited Partnership 0.0156*** 0.00738 0.0146** 0.0165*** 0.0149 0.0155***
(0.00590) (0.0148) (0.00582) (0.00596) (0.0155) (0.00588)
  Joint Stock -0.00566 -0.0358*** -0.00545 -0.00233 -0.0166 -0.00219
(0.00422) (0.0110) (0.00422) (0.00446) (0.0120) (0.00446)
  Limited Liability Company 0.00820** 0.0177 0.00807** 0.00896** 0.0202 0.00880**
(0.00391) (0.0127) (0.00389) (0.00390) (0.0127) (0.00389)
Relation Characteristic
  Rel_Length -0.00133 0.00893** -0.00135 -0.00112 0.0106*** -0.00113
(0.00159) (0.00418) (0.00159) (0.00159) (0.00406) (0.00159)
Other Loan Characteristics
   Installment 0.0244*** 0.0431*** 0.0231*** 0.0224*** 0.0379*** 0.0215*** 0.0169*** 0.0497*** 0.0164***
(0.00291) (0.00967) (0.00290) (0.00270) (0.00893) (0.00269) (0.00347) (0.0105) (0.00345)
   Amount -0.00376*** -0.0195*** -0.00367***
(0.000891) (0.00248) (0.000889)
   Maturity 0.00493** -0.00458 0.00454**
(0.00200) (0.00519) (0.00200)
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Pseudo R-squared 0.094 0.083 0.097 0.132 0.143 0.134 0.134 0.165 0.136
P0 0.045 0.029 0.045 0.039 0.061 0.039 0.039 0.057 0.039
Observations 25,391 4,364 25,391 25,380 4,345 25,380 25,380 4,345 25,380





Table 6: Empirical Relation between Loan Risk and Collateral Types 
This table reports results exploring the empirical relation between loan risk (Risk_Premium and 
Ex_Post_Nonperformance) and collateral types.  The omitted category is all unsecured loans.  OLS regressions are 
estimated for Risk_Premium, defined as the loan interest rate at loan origination minus the rate of U.S. Treasury 
securities with comparable maturity. Marginal effects from Probit regressions are presented for 
Ex_Post_Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days overdue any time after 
origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5).  In all cases, standard errors are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity using White standard errors and are reported in parentheses.  ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II III IV V VI VII
Liquid Collateral Types
   Pledged Deposits -1.692*** -1.773*** -1.168*** -1.160*** -0.0233*** -0.0175** -0.0178**
(0.123) (0.126) (0.272) (0.289) (0.00772) (0.00793) (0.00776)
   Bank Guarantees -1.185*** -0.763*** -1.142*** -1.196*** -0.0227** -0.0203** -0.0179*
(0.221) (0.221) (0.322) (0.342) (0.0108) (0.00978) (0.0107)
   Securities -0.718*** -0.820*** -0.403 -0.217 0.0156 0.00928 0.0121
(0.183) (0.184) (0.486) (0.415) (0.0247) (0.0218) (0.0228)
Illiquid Collateral Types
   Creditor-Held Movable Assets -0.965*** -0.822*** -0.823*** -0.658*** 0.0154 0.00264 0.000867
(0.0974) (0.0958) (0.140) (0.139) (0.00942) (0.00754) (0.00731)
  Debtor-Held Movable Assets -0.820*** -0.657*** -0.597** -0.556** 0.0797*** 0.0619*** 0.0658***
(0.0892) (0.0815) (0.252) (0.253) (0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0108)
  Residential Real Estate 0.742*** 0.558*** -0.156 0.0927 0.0511*** 0.0499*** 0.0470***
(0.0861) (0.0842) (0.161) (0.161) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0125)
  Commercial Real Estate -0.368*** -0.496*** -0.406 -0.00847 0.0733*** 0.0766*** 0.0749***
(0.120) (0.119) (0.302) (0.290) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0187)
  Collateral Bonds -0.343*** -0.332*** -0.382*** -0.318*** 0.0159 0.00522 0.00751
(0.0821) (0.0832) (0.121) (0.113) (0.00967) (0.00807) (0.00842)
  Vehicles -0.157 -0.311* -0.353 0.0487 0.0583* 0.0708** 0.0603*
(0.157) (0.165) (0.312) (0.239) (0.0330) (0.0360) (0.0336)
Past Nonperformance
  Prior Default 0.582** 0.0202 0.0180
(0.236) (0.0253) (0.0245)
  Prior NPL 0.471*** 0.0607*** 0.0617***
(0.0294) (0.00436) (0.00440)
Firm Characteristics
  General Partnership -0.431*** -0.0117 -0.0137
(0.137) (0.0101) (0.00959)
   Limited Partnership -0.319*** 0.0134** 0.0144**
(0.0477) (0.00574) (0.00582)
  Joint Stock -1.213*** -0.00497 -0.00152
(0.0434) (0.00425) (0.00451)
  Limited Liability Company -0.366*** 0.00776** 0.00848**
(0.0359) (0.00391) (0.00390)
Relation Characteristics
  Rel_Length 0.0451*** -0.00115 -0.000984
(0.0161) (0.00159) (0.00159)
Other Loan Characteristics
   Installment 0.0242 0.00738 0.0465 0.565*** 0.0217*** 0.0197*** 0.0158***
(0.0266) (0.0257) (0.0487) (0.0640) (0.00290) (0.00268) (0.00343)
   Amount 0.0159 -0.00389***
(0.0202) (0.000894)
-0.535*** 0.00368*
   Maturity (0.0426) (0.00203)
Constant 11.06*** 10.71*** 9.248*** 9.864***
(0.0947) (0.124) (0.0245) (0.203)
Fixed Effects
Industry Included Included Included
Region Included Included Included Included Included
Bank Included Included Included Included Included
Time (Month-Year) Included Included Included Included Included
Firm*Bank*Time Included Included
(Adjusted) R-Square 0.363 0.414 0.922 0.925
Pseudo R-Square 0.100 0.138 0.140
P0 0.044 0.039 0.039
Observations 28,252 28,252 13,274 13,274 25,391 25,380 25,380
Risk_Premium Ex_Post_Nonperformance
(OLS) (Probit Model - Marginal Effects)
 
